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Do you enjoy reading reports from the Academies online for free? Sign up for email notifications and we'll let you know about new publications in your areas of interest when they're released. Get This Book. Visit NAP. Looking for other ways to read this? No thanks. Suggested Citation: "E1: Brazil. Page Share Cite. Aspergillus spp. Candida spp Salmonella spp. Virologia M. Microbiologia E.
MDR: multi-drug resistant a according to Brazilian rule b undergoing validation and commissioning 2- What government organizations are responsible for safety and security of high-containment biological high BSL laboratories? Microorganisms African cassava mosaic virus Citri spiroplasma Duck hepatitis virus, types 1, 2 and 3 Agrobacterium ruby Citrus leper virus Eastern equine encephalitis virus Amanita muscarina Clavibacter iranicus Encephalitis virus of Powassan Amapari virus Clavibacter michiganensis subspecies Enteritis virus of Ducks, Geese and Apiosporina morbid insidiosus Swans Apple Chat Fruit Clavibacter michiganensis subspecies Enzootic encephalomyelitis flu virus Apple proliferation nebraskensis Ephemeral fever virus of cattle Aspergillus flavus Clavibacter michiganensis subspecies Erwinia amylovora Aspergillus ochraceus sepedonicus Erwinia cypripedii Aspergillus parasiticus Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin Erwinia raphontici Aujeszky disease virus producers Escherichia coli producing verotoxins Banana bunchy top virus Cochliobolus miyabeanus Fusarium graminearum Bartonella sp.
Cowdria ruminatum lycopersici Cadang-cadang viroids Coxiella burnetii Fusarium sporotrichioides Candidatus liberobacter africanus Crinipellis pernicious Gibberella fujikuroi Candidatus liberobacter asiaticus Curtobacterium flaccumfaciens pv. Gibberella xylarioides Chikungunya fever virus poinsettiae Globodera sp. Chlamydia psittaci Dengue hemorrhagic fever virus Glomerella manihotis Chondrostereum purpureum Deuterophoma tracheiphila Grapevine flavescence pains.
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Guignardia bidwellii Pantoea stewartii Rickettsia tsutsugamushi Guignardia citricarpa Paracoccidioides braziliensis Rickettsia typhi Guinea grass mosaic virus Parana virus Rustic Xanthomonas pv. Louis encephalitis virus Kahawae Colletotrichum Phoma tracheiphila Sugarcane Fiji disease virus Colletotrichum coffeanum var. Whether or not to establish such facilities? For regular oversight and re-certification? How, to whom, and when are they reported? Who has authority to investigate accidents? What disciplinary or legal actions can be taken? There are only provisions for working with GMOs.
Login or Register to save! Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories summarizes the workshop discussion, which included the following topics: Technological options to meet diagnostic, research, and other goals; Laboratory construction and commissioning; Operational maintenance to provide sustainable capabilities, safety, and security; and Measures for encouraging a culture of responsible conduct.
Risk Class a. Lab BSL. Aspergillus M.
Brucella abortus FMDV. Sanidade Animal e Virologia. FMDV Brucella spp.
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Mycobacterium bovis. Avian Influenza virus Newcastle virus. Escherichia coli Chlostridium botulinum Coccidioides immitis Penicillium spp. Former HHS secretary Kathleen Sebelius, who held the position at the time the task force issued its recommendations, was traveling and unavailable for an interview. USDA officials involved with the task force were traveling and unavailable for comment, a spokesperson said. Officials with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy did not respond to requests for comment about the recommendations, but they noted other recent actions taken to improve safety and assess the select agent regulations.
Creating a better lab incident reporting system — and process for disseminating lessons learned — is critical to reducing lab accidents, several experts said. Blank said the United States needs to create a more comprehensive biosafety program for laboratories and not focus only on select agents with an emphasis on security. He said Canada's system of lab oversight could serve as a model. The lack of transparency about lab incidents, federal oversight and enforcement actions — and even the whereabouts of research facilities experimenting with risky pathogens are other issues that need addressing, some public health experts and community advocates said.
Of particular concern are high-containment labs that work with the most dangerous microbes, yet there is no publicly available list of the facilities and even health departments and the federal government don't know where they all are. USA TODAY's "Biolabs in Your Backyard" project identified more than biosafety level 3 and 4 lab facilities nationwide and disclosed in an online interactive database information about their research and more than 20, pages of their safety records collected lab-by-lab.
Suspend Work, Close Most Biosafety Labs, Experts Say
USA TODAY's database of labs is a "good start," but it's not comprehensive and local public health officials need federal regulators to share information about the labs and the types of pathogens they work with, said Blank, whose association's members include health department laboratories that monitor and detect health threats in their communities and respond to outbreaks. They're not particularly forthcoming, and that's kind of puzzling," Blank said. Health officials must know about labs and lab incidents in their communities to be prepared to respond quickly to assess for any threat to public health, identify those who may have been exposed and, if needed, assist in arranging quarantine or ensuring infection control, said Chris Aldridge, senior director for infectious diseases and informatics at the National Association of County and City Health Officials.
The mistakes with shipments of live anthrax by the Army's Dugway Proving Ground are an example of how local public health labs and officials become the front-line responders when incidents happen, Aldridge and Blank noted.
He said there needs to be legislation to require regular disclosures of lab operations and incidents, similar to weekly public reporting required about safety issues at nuclear facilities done through the independent Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. Yundt said the public and policymakers should be able to readily find out, at least in general terms, the kinds of pathogens and research underway at each facility.
Without that information, it's difficult to compare what labs are doing and determine whether efforts are duplicated and taxpayer money is used efficiently. Los Alamos completed an environmental assessment in of plans to build two BSL-3 labs. The facility to house them was constructed a year later. The assessment said that additional BSL-3 labs were required due to the increasing concern that biological agents could pose a national security threat. Similar labs elsewhere, it said, were often booked for other projects and using them added risks in handling the agents. Most of the work would come from other federal agencies rather than the Department of Energy, the IG report said, while the demand for work from these agencies is less certain than Los Alamos claimed.
The report said officials at one of the agencies said it was planning to build its own BSL-3 facility in the next two years. It did not say which one. They did not respond to requests for further comment. In the response, NNSA Administrator Frank Klotz wrote that his agency would develop metrics to measure the use of biosafety labs and would use that data to make decisions on facilities.
Klotz wrote that the proposed work at Los Alamos could not be conducted at Lawrence Livermore laboratory, though he did not explain why.
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